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Our principal objective in this article is to develop a conceptual framework that
should permit us to handle some major descriptive problems in the conception of
knowledge based systems. In order to be able to put forward in a systematic way our
concepdon of knowledge representation (KR), we will discuss in the first secdon
§ome central problems of knowledge description such as the notion of "knowledge
standard" or the problem of recursive definition of a set of configurations (of
intensional endties) that describe or define some given domain of reference. We put
forward, furthermore, some hypothescs concerning the domain of reference of KR
üat we call tnowledge management". In the second section, we will introduce the
conceptual graph theory developed mainly by Sowa (1984) and try to give a more
formal account of KR
lvrr,oDugno¡.¡
There exists an impressive quantity of literature dealing with knowledge
representation that covers highly technical contributions as well as more
philosophical ones or again those that have a more or less explicit "cognitive"
orientation. So, it is not very astonishing to notice that the definition of what
knowledge representation is, is quite vague.
It is not our intention to give a historical survey of that notion nor to proceed
to a critical enumeration of the several topics that are covered by it. Our objective
is, raüer, to develop a conceptual framework that should permit us to hanále the
major descriptive problems in the conception of knowledge based systems.
In order to be able to put forth in a systematic way our conception of
knowledge representation (KR), we will discuss in the first section some central
problems of knowledge description. In the second section, we will introduce the
conceptual graph theory developed mainly by Sowa (1984) and try to give a more
formal account of KR.
I We would like to thank Chris Hinton for the rewriting of the English version of this article.
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l) KnouiedgeDesoiption
There are a lot of hypoüeses and üeories of what üe nature of knowledge is:
neurological activity, linguistic activity, psychological activity, purely formal
activity, and so on. For the moment, it seems to us that we have not any serious
proof to enable us to choose between üese theories and others. The sole
possibility that we have is to put forward competing desoiptions and to t¿st tluir
aalidi$ relative ta a cont¿xt in which knowledge becomes "active" and obserr¡able.
Let us assume that we are in the Louwe museum, in Paris, and that our
attention is caught by a wooden, monochrome statuette of the 14ü century, in
goüic style, representing the Virgin Mary holding the crucified Christ in her
arms. Basically, our attention could be satisfied in nuo ways: eiüer we have
"enough information" about üe statuette and we are able to identi$ it ourselves
(given a degree of precision üat requires üe satisfaction of our attention) or we
do not have "enough information" and, in this case, we are obliged to consult an
information source that is better informed.
Let us assume, now, that the satisfaction of our attention corresponds to the
characterization of the statuette that we have given above ("statuette", '\,vooden",
"monochrorne", ...). If we are able to satisfy our attention alone, we must,















MOTIF: 'Virgin Mary holding in her arms the crucified Christ"
If we do not have this model "in our heads", we have to look for it elsewhere
-in other words, we have to consult a source of information, not any source of
information but a relevant source of information which is a source that possesses
or exhibits exactly that model.
P. Stockinger,/ Conceptual analysis
Roughly speaking, the statuette in üe Louwe is a thing or an object which is
accessible or interpreted by some "model" that constitutes a kind of vision or t
kind of hnowlcdge of this thing or object.
Now, we have to distinguish between the mod¿l or üe sch,etna üat exiss in üe
head (or somewhere else) and üat enables someone to assert something about
an object and the exprcssiae form that we are free to choose in order to represent
this model or schema. Indeed, the above model with its different labels
constitutes, properly speaking, th,e represmtation of a (mental, social, ...) model
that gives us a üew of an object. We could have chosen for the labels SCULPTURE,
PERIOD, and so on, some arbitrary symbols (for example, the letters S or P) or
again some more perceptively oriented symbols (for example, a schematic figure
instead of the label scurrrURE or a diamond instead of the label prruoD). Such
changes do not affect at all üat which is generally called üe descriptive power
and adequacy of the model. It only affects the language of expression 
-thelrninnlag in a very wide sense- that we use in order to represent a described
vision or knowledge. Naturally, the use of some verbal or üsual language of
expression presupposes rules of its usage; otherwise the representation of
knowledge becomes completely arbitrary.
Our "model" representing a certain vision of the statuette, which is exposed
in the Louwe museum, is, in its actual form, only a very incomplete outline of all
üose of someone's activities that we could possibly observe in a given situation. [t
says nothing, for instance, of the relationships that hold benueen the several
quoted generic features. The identification of these relationships is, nevertheless,
an important criterion in the description of knowledge because, in one context,
someone could 'bring together" the features DATATION and STATUETTE whereas,
in another context, he could 'bring together" the features DATATION and MOTIF.
So, even if someone asserts the existence of a set of generic features, he could
simultaneously assert different cunfguratiors of them. In our example, someone
asserts two configurations with the triplet DATATION, MOTIF and STATUETTE: with
the first one, he asserts the temporal location of the statuette (l4th centuy), but
with the second one, he asserts the temporal location of the motif (he ascertains,
for instance, the fact üat the motif represented by üe staruette has existed since
the first century of the Christian era).
The central notion here is the notion of configuration, which expresses the
hypothesis that knowledge is a "structured whole" or, in a more technical
terminology, an intensional entity that could be represented informally, for our
example, as follows:
SCULPTURE: "statuette'
is characterized by PERIOD: "gothic"
is characterized by tvtrttE,RIAL: 'kood"
is characterized by CHROMATICS: "monochrome"
is characterized by DATING: "14th century"
is characterized by MOTIF:'The Virgin Mary holding in her arms üe
crucified Christ".
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The internal structure of this configuration is a very simple one: it states only
the fact that there is one, and only one, generic feature (i.e., SCULPTURE) that is
interpreted by a set of other features which are independent of one another (i.e.,
between which no relationship exists).
The label "is charactenzed by" does not represent a defined relation. [t could
be substituted by an arrow or an arbitrary symbol but the substitution of
representational figures would not change anything in the meaning of the
relation. Intuitively, we prefer to label the relation between SCULPTURE and
PERIOD with the name "is localized by', suggesting by this change that there is a
relation of temporal location between these two features. Nevertheless, if we do
not have a theory of temporal location or of the relation of characterization, üe
use of different labels is completely arbitrary and has not any consequence for üe
description of knowledge and is formal treatment.
One of the most difficult problems in knowledge representation is precisely
the problem of the definition and of the elaboration of conceptual and formal
theories of the canonical types of relations we need for the description of
knowledge.
The above outlined model only labels the dimensions DATATION, MOTWE,
CHROMATICS, and so on. But suppose, now, that we "ask" our model: what is
MOTM?, what is DATATION?, what is CHROMATICS? If our model should explain
what these dimensions mean, it must incorporate theories of them 
-in the most
simple case, definitions and descriptions.
In this sense, a structural configuration like our model is itself composed of
other configurations which are either more general than üe configuration that
"houses" üem or which constitutes a model to which the configuration (or parts
ofit) refers (refer).
Let us assume, furthermore, that we are not entirely satisfied by a response
given following the quoted model. We could be dissatisfied, for instance, because
the response is too general or because it leaves out several aspects such as the
identity of the artist who is the creator of the sculpture, the place of its produc-
tion, its history or its cultural context.
Those possible reactions to a given response lead us to take into account that
knowledge and therefore also is description is context-depmdent. There does not
exist one and only one true and relevant knowledge of something. Knowledge is
true and relevant only given a certain context (or'\,vorld").
We have, therefore, from a descriptive point of üew, to introduce the notion
of context that validates a model of a domain of reference. In our terminology,
we will speak of a confgurational cont¿xtualization. As we will see again later on, a
configurational contextualization may be decomposed in an "outer' con-
figuration (the so-called contextual configuration) that dominates one or more
"inner" confi gurations ( the so<alled contextualized configuration ).
If we assume that there is a description of the statuette like our initial one but
that there may exist, simultaneously, other possible descriptions of the same
object and that someone could or would like to handle them together (given cer-
tain goals of personal or professional satisfaction or something like this) then we
have to ask ourselves how we can deal wiü üat from a descriptive point of view.
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In taking into account, for instance, several textual sources relating
something about üe statuette in question, one source might give a general
description in the spirit of the above outlined model; another source might give a
more specific one focusing on, let us say, the motif of the statuette, its history, its
syrnbolic aura or its relationships with other Christian symbols; a third source
might introduce complementary information "activating" generic features like
"authorship" or, again, 'geographic origin" of the statuette; a fourü source might
expose, in comparison to other sources of information, some controversial
information 
-it might ascertain, for instance, that the authorship of the statuette
is not indiüdual but collective or that the statuette is not a statuette of the 14th
century but of the beginning of the l5ü century and so on.
Finally, one can quite easily imagine that there is yet anoüer source of
information, a more differentiated and complex one, that handles all the
information exposed, separately, by all those sources of information: it describes
the statuette following our generic model; it focuses on, let us say in a special
paragraph, the motif of the statuette, then introduces the question of the
authorship and the geographic location of the statuette and discusses, finally,
litigious information like the datation of the statuette or the collective or
individual authorship of it.
Our example of the different sources of information is, as we feel, a quite
realistic one that refers to what is sometimes called a context of multicxpertise,
i.e., a context that is characterized by a multiplicity or a cornrmtni$ of expefis who
deal with an object or a situation. A configuration referring to such a situation is
normally a very complex one that we do not wish to describe as such and by itself.
We would much prefer to identi$ and describe more basic configurations and a
set of rules with which we are able 
-as in generative grammar- to derive or to
generate such a complex confrguration.
The elaboration of such "configurational grammar' encounters several major
problems for which we have to find some solutions:
a) of all the information that constitutes a complex configuration, which
information should be described?;
b) what are the basic assumptions that underlie the information üat we have
to describe?;
c) what are the "mechanisms' that permit that information from the basic
assumptions be derived?;
d) among the information that should be described, which could be
considered as given or known information and which should be considered as
novel or unknown?;
e) what is the "nature" of the controversy concerning the information üat
should be described?;
0 how should we lead someone ürough all üis information in order to
enable him to satisS his objectives?
I
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Problem (a) refers to the question of what is a repramtafute (relnant) set of
hnowlzdgc for a knowledge description; problem (b), to the question of what is
¡he canonical ba.¡is of a representative set of knowledge; problem (c), to the
question of what are the oprations or, again, the rul¿s of fonnation we need in
order to derive from the canonical basis the whole representative set of
knowledge; problem (d), to the question of what part of the representative set of
knowledge should be introduced as partially neut defnitions rclying on canonical
knowledge and/or deriued knwledge; problem (e), to the question of which of üe
differences in the representative set of knowledge is (are) within üe scope of
conceptual relativity or in that of refermtial reLaüvi$, as well as to üe question of
how to handle th¿ revision of (a rubset ofl knowbdge; problem (f), finally, to the
question of what is a representative set of conceptual plan struchfies.
We assume that these problems 
-and üose quoted before- constitute, at
least, a subset of major questions in the description and formalization of
knowledge or as we prefer to say, of. stand,ards of hnowlzdge, Therefore, we assume,
too, that a theory of conceptual description relies heavily on the following central
notions for which it has to provide a formal üeory:
(set ofl configuraüon(s),
refrmud confguration,
canqnical confguraüons and forrnation ru les,
car{igurational proj e cü un,
canfigurational abstra ction and d,efni tion,
c onf gura ti o na I c o n tcx tu a liz a ti o n,
configurational p artiüoning (rru du larization),
confgurational d¿duction (resolut:ion).
In the second section of this article, we will try to give a more systematic
account of these notions which constitute, from our point of view, the desripüae
modzl of a knrutled,ge standard. The appropriate formal üeories will be introduced
by the means of the conceptual graph theory that furnishes us, at the same time,
with a language of representation (stricto sensu) by the means of which a
descriptive model may be expressed and communicated.
2) I(nowled,ge Managütlent
Until now we have introduced several major problems concerning üe description
of knowledge but we have left out of our discussion the question of the field or
domain of refrmce of o desription. Let us come back, therefore, to our initial model
representing some knowledge concerning a statuette in the Louvre in Paris. An
open question here is what kind of knowledge üis model exactly represents. One
could ask, for instance, if this model represents a description of the word
"statuette" that refers to an identified object (i.e., üe statuette in the Louvre) or
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üe üsual form "statuette' that is materialized by the identified object or, again, a
kind of topic or üematic vision of üe given statuetre (and maybe, partially ar
least, for a whole class of more or less equivalent objects) that could be
communicated either by a verbal language of expression or a üsual one or again
by one and only one (written or spoken) document as well as by several
documents.
This kind of underdetermination of the correspondence between our
description and is domain of reference leads us to the necessity to postulate a
hypothetical structure or organization that seems to characterize üe domain of
reference. In a more Tarskian or model-üeoretic inspired terminology, we have
to adr¡¿nce some hypoüesis concerning an object (-language ) in order to be able
to decide on üe uuth-conditions or 
-as Daüdson puts it- on the convention T(Davidson 1990) that holds benveen a given metalanguage of description and the
object (-language).
We will call the object of KR by the name knowlzdge managerrunl and suggest
that it is constituted by three major components (Stockinger 1993):
the component called "doatment"
üe component called "cont¿xt of communication"
the component called "life cycb" (of the document and/ or the context of
communication).
It is out of question to furnish here a more detailed account of the
hypothetical structure of knowledge management (Vogel 1988, Hart 1988). Our
intention is only to present some general aspects of the component "document".
In speaking of the component "document" that constitutes one major part of
knowledge management, we do not necessarily restrict this notion to is habitual
understanding in terms of '\uritten document" or "text'. It is well known that
there are a lot of different types of supports and media by the means of which
information or knowledge is communicated and conserved. In this sense, a
document can be a spoken one, a visual one, a gestural one, and it can be physi-
cally realized by several supports including the physiological support of human
memory.
In this sense, we consider the document in an extremely general sense as a
stru,clured. or organiztd whole of inforrnation m kniledge üat uses one or more
expressive or semiotic codes as well as one or more physical supports in order to
be able to communicate, to store, and to maintain information or knowledge.
The next question that arises is how we could approach the notion of
"document" as a structured whole of information and knowledge. We put forward
the hypothesis that üe document is organized into several major levels, which are
the following ones:
¡lr.e them¿tic laxl (dealing wiü üe topic or üe content of the document);
¡}ae lanl of the languap oÍ expression (dealing wiü üe 'tncoding" or
"decoding" of a topic by the means of verbal and/ or non-verbal languages) ;
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the l.nel of the formal and phy§cal organization (dealing with the "format" of
üe document and with the medium of expression);
the l"euel of the support (dealing with the physical realization or existence of
the document);
the latel calbd "rwta4oanment" (dealing with the insertion of a document
in the context of cornmunication and in its life-cycle).
In considering especially the thematic level and the level of the languages of
expression, there are, from a methodological point of view, two important
distinctions to draw. The first one concerns the fact that the topic or the content
of a document (or a class of documents) should not be confused with the
linguistic or non-linguistic (üsual, ...) expression of it. In referring again to our
example of the statuette, there may exist, on the one hand, one or more
knowledge standards concerning this object and, on the other hand, one or more
codes of expression of these knowledge standards 
-a linguistic code or a üsual
code or a code of gestures that enable us to speak about this knowledge and to
communicate about it.
Now, it is clear too, at least since the linguistic researches of Harris as well as
Hymes, that there are several more or less well distinguishable sub-languages by
the means of which someone can speak about topics referring, for instance, to
objecs like our statuette.
In this sense, we have to deal with several types and sets of knowledge
standards (or "conventions" in the sense of Lewis 1969): one type concerns the
set of available thematic knowledge standards, another type concerns the set of
available linguistic knowledge standards or visual knowledge standards. More
generally, euery latel of the doatmmt artiailat¿s a crtain $pe of knowledge standarü.
The production or the comprehension of a document must therefore be
understood 
-metaphoricall¡ as a kind of "teamwork" of specialized competences
that work tqJether in order to produce or to understand a document.
From a theoretical as well as from a practical point of view, this vision
possesses important consequences because for the construction of KBS it requires
not only the coordination of different competences but also a rather special
architecture of a KBS, which is the one used in distributed artificial intelligence
and in multi-agent systems where a "community" of specialized actors cooperates
for the solution of a given problem (Bond and Gasser (eds.) 1988, Gleizes and
Glize 1990).
The second important distinction is that a document can be approached
following a purely thematic perspective or following a textual or discursive
approach.
The second perspective is rather common in text linguistics or semiotics:
given one or more documents (viz. a "corpus"), the principal goal is to
reconstruct the üematic standards or 
-as van Dijk (1977) puts it- the semantic
macrostnrctures "behind" üem. The major problem here is the identification
and stabilization of a thematic standard or a semantic macrostructure. Indeed,
the reconstruction of a thematic standard already presupposes a hypothesis or,
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again, rich and explicit thematic knowledge so üat one can proceed to the
identification and stabilization of the sought thematic standard.
In the first perspective, the emphasis is given to the description and
modelization of üematic knowledge, whether this knowledge is completely or
only partially expressed, and stored in one, two or z physically existing
documents.
This approach undoubtedly prevails in existing KBS such as, for instance, in
expert systems or in computer assisted tutorial systems. But noüing prevents us
from drawing a more general definition of knowledge based systems, also
including other knowledge standards that are relevant in knowledge
management. Given this more general definition, expert systems or intelligent
tutorial systems are only special cases of KBS, like computer assisted text
production and translation systems, electronic edition and information retrieval
systems.
The lesson we want to retain is that the n¡,o quoted perspectives presuppose
each other in the sense that in more developed KBS for knowledge management
the translation of thematic knowledge into a language of expression and the
access from linguistic or textual sources to thematic knowledge are just as
important as üe manipulation of purely thematic or expert-knowledge (see, for
instance, Lytje 1990).
In order to deal with a document, we have to elaborate desriptions that refer
to the different levels as well as a comnunication protocol that permits the
interaction of these descriptions for the production or comprehension of a
document. The elaboration of descriptions presupposes some hypotheses
concerning possible canonical stn¡ctures of the several levels that constitute a
document, on the one hand, and concerning the structure of the descriptive
metalanguage itself, on the other hand.
We should consider these hypotheses in an abductive perspective, üat is, in a
perspective of backward and forward motions between some kind of a given and
assumed theory of a specific level and its object of reference. In other words, we
need hlpotheses in order to start a descriptive work but there is not any guar-
antee that they are the best ones.
As far as the different levels of a document are concerned, there are, in
particular, the level of the formal and physical organization of documents as well
as the level of the languages of expression, especially, the natural language
system, which has been studied in a rather systematic fashion.
A long tradition in descriptive grammar has provided linguistics with a
metalinguistic canon that is generally used in natural language analysis. Even if
there exist quite important problems that are often due to a too specific or to a
too particular languagedependent definition of descriptive metaterms, there
exists nevertheless a more general consensus among linguiss on how to tackle
morphological, syntactical and lexico-syntactical questions. Most of the problems
are either problems concerning the choice of an appropiate formal theory for
linguistic descriptions or problems concerning the limits of the object of
reference of linguistics.
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The latter gready influences the approach of natural language semantics.
There is one extreme version {efended, for instance, by Jackendoff (1983,
1990)- that natural language semantics is part of a general conceptual semantics,
and there is another extreme version {efended by a Whorfian inspired language
üeory- that outside language no semantics exists at all or, in other words, that
natural language determines meaning in general.
We will not enter into this debate. Neverüeless, we think that there are good
meüodological reasons to drastically limit the object of linguistics and to reserve
most of the semantic and pragmatic questions to what we call here the thematic
level of a document. In üis sense, üe description of a linguistic standard or a
standard of any other semiotic system by which a thematic standard becomes
accessible and is communicated has to take into account principally:
a) t}re expressiue unities (the "words") that constitute a language of
expression;
b) t}:.e refamtial value of each expressive unity in respect of a given üematic
standard as well as the axiological orint¿nsional distribution of üe positions that an
expressive unity occupies in the language of expression;
c) the ntbs üat permit highu ordqed expressiae unities ("syntagma", phrases,
...) to be produced.
Note that this claim is not as reductionist as it may seem. We must not
confuse, for instance, the expressive unities called '\,vords" with a lexicological or
terminological acceptation in the sense of socalled (semantically) 'Tull words".
There are not only highly specified thematic standards referring, for instance,
to technical or cultural objects of reference (like our description of the statuette
in the Louvre) but also a good variety of generic üemes corresponding more or
less to common sense knowledge standards like space, time, action, reality, and so
on. Such themes are commonly encoded by the socalled syncategorematic
expressive unities that will not change, or will change only very slightly, from one
given standard of a language of expression to another standard. The reason is
simply a kind of general agreement or tacit convention that for highly recurrent
themes, it is more economical to use a fairly fixed set of expressive unities than to
let them be expressed differently by different speakers.
Concerning the so<alled lexical polysemy, let us mention only that it is highly
constrained by üe axiological or intensional distribution and by its insertion in
higher ordered expressive unities as well as by the fact that it is quite often due to
a kind of underspecification with respect to a given and relatively specialized
thematic standard. The phenomenon of the lexical underspecification is, in a
certain sense, the inverse phenomenon of the repetitive character of üe use of a
fixed set of expressive unities in order to account for generic themes. At least, as
far as common language standards are concerned, it is out of the question to
create for each new thematic standard, new expressive unities which would lead
to a kind of quantitative explosion of the number of expressive unities 
-as is the
case in the so-called Fachsprachen ("specialized languages") and which could
strongly prohibit the communicative task of a common language.
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In any case, the point that u¡e want to stress here is that the description of a
standard of a given (verbal or non-verbal) language of expression proceeds with
respect to the three poins quoted above: the first point deals with the extensional
values of an expressive unity, the second, with the intensional values of an
expressive unity and üe üird, wiü the constructional 
-or syntactical- patterns
and rules of a language of expression.
Let us consider the third point of our methodological stipulation. The
representative set of configurations corresponds to all "phrases" (or "phrase
structures") that, given a set of canonical configurations (of assumed "primitive"
phrase suuctures) and several formation rules, could be recursively generated by
a grammar. This is the program initiated by Chomsky and actually largely
assumed to be a correct one. Given a derived phrase structure, üere exist,
necessarily, not only some more specific configurations but also more general
ones. Therefore, it is correct to assume üat the recursive definition of a set of
phrase structures relies also on the operation of configurational projection.
Concerning the configurational definition, it is always possible to introduce, in a
given grammar, new patterns and rules that must be compatible wiü üe basic
assumptions, with the canonical basis of the grammar. Furthermore, con-
figurational condensation and expansion are quite usual in structural and
generative descriptions where a symbolic term like '?' for "phrase" or 'NP' for
"nominal phrase" can be substituted by (expanded) appropriate structural
configurations. The operations of configurational contextualization, finally,
permit to take into account not only modal frames that modify a phrase stn¡cture
but also different sets of "primitive" phrase structures that correspond to different
(linguistic, ...) competences.
It is important to distinguish betn¡een the problem of accessing or generating
thematic knowledge by the means of natural language and the problem of
thematic knowledge management itself. A system that should simulate, for
instance, a political crisis in a given geographical region needs, on the one hand,
extremely rich and developed descriptions of üe topic "crisis' that one can find
in very different information sources and, on the other hand, an access to a
database of documents where this information is stored as well as at least a natural
languageJike communication system with the user. The first problem could not
be handled by superficial descriptions of prominent lexical items that refer to
peculiar situations characterizing the evolution of a crisis as is often suggested by
the use of very general (and often extremely loosely defined) metaterms like
ACTION, STATE, INTENTION, PIAN, and so on. But, given well-elaborated
subcategorization frames of lexical item\ and the existence of a syntactical parser,
such a "semantic" characterization is sufficient for the access of relevant
information in a textual database (see, for example, the lexical information
retrieval system cRATEx, developed by Lyqje (1993) as rvell as for the "navigation"
in such a database. Let us note again, that this is true, too, for the construction of
nonJinguistic interfaces like graphic interfaces or, more generally, for multi-
media (multimodal) interfaces (May 1993).
Let us consider, too, the objective of the creation of vittual doanments. It is
well-known that several industrial and technological sectors are extremely
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"gourmand" in the quantity of their production of documents. So, üe idea is to
develop, instead of producing a huge amount of physically existing documents, a
big KB containing a set of classes of generic libraries where each one represents
some relevant piece of information or knowledge of a domain of reference. Given
the particularity of the request of a potential user, one or more libraries will be
activated and, by the means of a textproduction system, the user will obtain a
"personalized" document that communicates the wanted information to him.
Here, again, it is out of the question to undertake the constitution of such
Iibraries by the means of linguistic theories or methods. In order to develop a
general architecture of such libraries and the thematic configurations that are
represented by them, we have to appeal to what is called rich and domain specific
knowledge or "expert-knowledge". The real problem that arises here is how we
can capture the thematic level, how we can, hypothetically, deal wiü it.
We have already quoted the existence of a set of thematic standards de-
scribing (generic) situations of "time", "space", "action', "real situation", "possible
situation", "counterfactual situation", and so on. This set of thematic standards is,
at least hypothetically, understandable by the means of the description of
corresponding linguistic expressions as well as by the means of appropriate
formal theories (logic of time, action, ...).
Another set of thematic standards which is very important for the constitution
of electronical libraries can be approached, again hypothetically, by a completely
different theoretical tradition, which is that of classical rhetoric. It is K McKeown
who has been one of the first to realize the high interest of classical rhetoric for a
thematic approach of text generation (McKeown 1985). Since her seminal work,
several researches have been done in this direction reusing and actualizing the
theoretical and practical insights of classical rhetoric in order to develop text
understanding and text generation systems, methodologies of knowledge
acquisition as well as thematic library-codes.
We cannot deal here extensively with the rhetorical approach. Let us quote
only very general lines of it. In rhetoric, there exists a well-known distinction
between the "inventio", the "dispositio", the "elocutio", the "actio', and the
"memoria" (Lausberg 1963).
T}:e invmtio deals with the elicitation of themes that are relevant for a given
purpose, the dispositio, with the structuring of the elicited themes in ordered
sequences, the eloantio, with the choice of the most appropriate "verbal sub-
language" in order to express and to communicate a thematic standard, the acüo,
with the real communication that is sometimes also called the pronunciatio of a
thematic standard, and the mcmoria 
-as its name already indicater, with the
memorisation of a thematic standard and adapted reuse in other situations.
The parallels ben¡een these distinctions in classical rhetoric and our own
conception of the object "document" are fairly obüous: the "inventio" and the
"dispositio" correspond to the thematic level of a document; the "elocutio", to the
level of the languages of expression; the "actio" or "pronunciatio", to the level of
üe supporq and the "memoria", to the reuse of thematic library<odes.
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Let us consider succintly üe "inventio" and the "dispositio". Given a certain
context of communication as well as the life-cycle of a document, the "inventio"
proposes two procedures for the elicitation of rele'v'ant themes:
t hanistic proced,ure by tlv rneans of the systcmatic questianing of an object of
refrence: how?, where?, who?, when?, ... (note that the systematicity of this
procedure depends on the existence of thematic standards of the set of those
standards that deal with general and generic situations as "time", "space",
"reality", "modality", "action', and so on);
a hatristic procedure by tlu means of already existing topoi ("common places")
which are nothing else üan partially reusable generic libraries in a new context
of application.
These two procedures seem to be at the basis of almost all methodologies of
üematic knowledge acquisition (see, for instance, Vogel 1988).
The "dispositio' deals not only with the ordering of relevant themes in
sequ.anced confgurations but also, and even more specially, with the rhetoric pred,icates
or the acts of discours¿ such as, for instance, the description, the narration, or the
explication. The interesting point here is the fact that classical rhetoric not only
furnishes us with rather systematic descriptions of these acs of discourse but also
methods showing how we can elaborate them. In üis sense, the heritage of
classical rhetoric is relevant not only with respect to theoretical and practical
purposes in the field of text understanding and text production (or generation)
but also with respect to descriptive problems concerning the refinement and the
elaboration of thematic context-sensitive reasoning procedures for KBS.
3) Cancephtal Ana$sis
Conceptual analysis constitutes a common and general framework that en-
compzsses not only linguistic descriptions but also non-linguistic ones as, for
instance, thematic descriptions, descriptions of the üsual language of expression,
the description of the formal structure of a document or the description of the
physical support of a document.
In this sense, it defines a descriptive strategy, in the sense of Dennett (1987),
that relies heavily on a theorl of conJiguraüon, which we will outline in the next sec-
tion, as well as on the three m¿thodological assurnpüons concrrning the activi$ of
description, which we have introduced in discussing succintly linguistic de-
scriptions.
As such, conceptual analysis defines therefore a conúnon shucture of the
different descriptions of the levels that constitute a document, of the context of
communication, and of the life-cycle of the document and the context. In this
sense, it is closely related to computer semiotics, as discussed by Hasle (1993).
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Sr,c,o¡vo Plrt:
CoNcemuAL Gx,epu THsonv AND FonuluzlrtoN
1) Th¿ Notion of 'Graph'
Let us repeat again the assumption that the "common structure" of descriptions
of knowledge standards is defined 
-at least partially- by the following central
notions, for which we have to provide explicit conceptual and formal üeories:
(set ofl confguraüon(s),
refermce d confi gura tio n,
canonical confgurations and, forrnation rubs,
c onft gura ti o n a I proj e c ti on,
conJigurational abstraction and definition,
confi gura tional con t¿x tua lizatio n,
confgurational partitioning (modularization),
conf gurational d¿ du ction (reso lu tion).
In this section, we will try to give a very general account of these notions by
the means of the conceptual graph theory developed by Sowa (1984). According
to him, a conceptual graph is a finite and connected graph which possesses two
kinds of entities: concepts and conceptual relations.
Every conceptual relation has one or more arcs, each of which must be linked to some
concepL If a relation has z arcs, it is said to be n adic, and its arcs are labeled 1, 2, ..., n.
The term morndic is synonymouswiü l-adic, dyadic with 2-adic, and tiadic with &adic. A
single concept by iself may form a conceptual graph, but every arc of every conceptual
relation must be linked to some concept (1984: 73).
Conceptual graphs are based on the mathematical theory of graphs (Leszner
1980) that defines a graph G
1) as consisting of:
a nonempty set E of edges or points,
a nonempty set A of arcs, and
2) where the following conditions must hold:
every arc must be linked to two (not necessarily different) edges,
no "cross{uts" between two different arcs, or again no point in which
one arc cuts itself, are allowed to exist.
In conceptual graphs, the edges or points are called concepts whereas a
conceptual relation may be either one arc or the product of two or 7¿ arcs.
Normally, a graph is represented by diagrams 
-a representation form which
goes back at least to Euler, the inventor of topology and the maüematical üeory
of graphs. For instance, diagram (l) is a graph whereas diagram (2) is not a
graph following the definition given above:
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Diagram I Diagram 2
In diagram (1) all arcs are linked to edges whereas in diagram (2) there is
one arc that has not an edge as is cutpoint.
Notice üat üe diagrammatic representation is only a convenient tool that
enables us to visualize abstract mathematical or logical entities and to speak about
them in spatial and perceptive terms (for instance, in terms like "path", "walk",
"loop", "endpoint" or "tree', "leaf', "root", and so on). All these terms, if üey are
used in a non-metaphorical sense, rely on precise formal definitions.
The graph represented by diagram I is called an und.irect¿d graph because the
arcs which are linked to its nodes do not possess any defined direction.
Therefore, one could '\ualk" from A to B as well as from B to A without any
difference, ü2. without any consequences as far as the direction of the walk is
concerned.
Directed graphs, on the other hand, possess arcs with an arrowhead which
indicates the direction that one has to follow in order to walk through a graph.
Consider the revised diagram I
20 LENGUAS MODERNAS 20, 1993
In this graph, one can walk from A to B or from A to D, but it is forbidden to
walk from B to A or from D to A.
Directed graphs are the basis of formal tools such as transition networks or
augmented transition networks, as used in artificial intelligence or computational
linguistics (Nilsson 1980, Allen 1987, Gazdar and Mellish 1989).
Even if we will not develop here in a more detailed form several aspecs of the
maüematical theory of graphs, let us note at least one interesting property of üe
revised graph represented by diagram l. This graph possesses an internal
structure that allows someone to start his walk at some point or edge and to come
back to it after haüng passed through several other poins or edges, cf.:
A-> al-> B-> a2-> D-> a5-> C-> a4-> A
A graph that possesses such a structure is called a direct¿d qclic graph. A more
constrained formal type of graph is the type of directed aclclic gaPh, which is a
graph where cycles do not exist. Consider the following diagram:
In this graph, one can walk from A to B, from B to D, from B to E or from B
to C. But there is no possibility of coming back to the source-point of the walk.
We quote this formal rype of graphs because it is frequently used in the
context of unification grammar (GPSG, FUG, DCG, ...) in computational linguistics
(cf. Shieber 1990). For instance, a structural description for a noun phrase in the
third person singular in the subject position could be represented as follows:
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In this formalism, the features ('tat", "nombre', "personne', ...) are translat-
ed as arcs $¡hereas the values of a feature are translated as rrodes. The root itself
and non-terminal nodes do not receive a special label.
As we will see again, the conceptual graph üeory of Sowa encompasses
directed cyclic as well as acyclic graphs and belongs üerefore to the same class of
formal theory as the quoted üeories used in computational linguistics.
In üe above quoted definition of conceptual graphs, the assumption that
conceptual graphs are connected is mentioned. By üis property we assume the
fact üat there exiss a possible path (directed or undirected) between any two
nodes of a gragh. Consider these two diagrams:
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Diagram I represents a connected bipartite graph. Diagram 2 shows two
disconnected graphs: the graph {A, B, C} and the graph {D}. In cutting the
directed arcs berween, on the one hand, A, B, C and, on the other hand, D, it is
impossible to find a paü between the four nodes. Note also that in cutting D
from A, B and C, üe graph {A, B, C} becomes a directed acyclic graph which
possesses a unique path benueen its nodes (sometimes such a directed acyclic
graph is called a tree).
In conceptual graphs, the nodes or edges represent the concept-types and üe
arcs, the conceptual relations. A conceptual graph may be represented as a
diagram (see figure 1) or in a linear form (see figure 2).
charHAWK










[LENGTH: @ 80 cm](char) 
-> 







Figure I and figure 2 show the same conceptual graph representing a very
simple thematic configuration üat defines a hawk by its length, its weight, and by
the colour of its feathers. Concept-types are represented either by boxes or by
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square brackets whereas conceptual relations are represented by circles or
rounded parenüeses. The domain or field of concept-types visualized by a box or
square brackes is divided into m,o parts 
-a left one and a right one- that are
separated by a colon: [ : ]. The left part receives the generic concepts or
concept-types whereas the right one houses the referents or the range of values
üat can satisry a generic concept or concept-rype.
There exists a special function 
-the function of instantiation- which possesses
two arguments from the sets "concept" and "referent" and whose range is the set
of truü values (true, false).
Conceptual relations are always oriented. The direction of a particular
conceptual relation is indicated by an arrowhead. By the introducti«>n of
conceptual relations, the set of concept-types that are recovered by a conceptual
graph is divided in ordered pairs of concepts whose elements are a concept
belonging to the set of source{oncepts and a concept belonging to the set of
goal-conceps. In this sense, a conceptual relation is a function that determines if
an ordered pair of concepts is true or false, viz. if an ordered pair of concepts (x,
y) is or is not an arc in the graph g.
Even if most of the commonly used conceptual relations can be defined as
functions with nvo arguments, this limitation is not an intrinsic one: conceptual
relations can also be defined over three, ... z¿-arguments.
In the linear transcription of a conceptual graph, as shown in figure 2, we
have to choose some concept or relation to be the head. In figure 2, the head is
üe concept [HAWK] . If we chose the concept colour as the head, the linear
transcription of the graph would be the follorving one:
[cotoun:'brown"] -(char) <- [FEATHER] -
(poss) <- IHAWK] -(char) 
-> 
[LENCTH: @ 80 cm]
(char) 
-> 
[wErGHT: @ 2 kgJ.
This graph represents a thematic description defining something like this: the
colour "broivn" is a characteristic of the feathers possessed by a harvk which has,
as other characteristics, a length of 80 cm and a weight of 2 kg.
See again the following linear transcription of the same graph:







This graph represents a thematic description defining the fact that the weight
of 2 kg is a characteristic of the hawk, rvhich possesses feathers which have as
characteristic the colour "brolvn", and rvhich also has, as a characteristic, a length
of 80 cm.
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An interesting feature of üe linear transcription of a conceptual graph is üe
fact that it necessarily exhibits a certain point of view 
-a certain concept- from
which üe graph or the represented description are defined. Even if üe truth-
values of a description are not submitted to changes, they nevertheless allow
different points of üew from which it could be seen or understood. So, there is a
kind of underdetermination between the truth of a description and its (subjective
or pragmatic) "apprehension" following a kind of principle of relevanry. But the
(subjective or pragmatic) "apprehension" of a description following a kind of
principle of relevancy necessarily presupposes the possibility of evaluating üe
truth-values of a description; otherwise, we would not be able to decide if we are
dealing with several points of view of a same description or if we are dealing, on
the contrary, wiü different descriptions.
2) The Rcpresentation and Fotmalization of ConJiguraüonal Descriptions \ the mcans of
Conceptual Graphs
Let us nor{ come back to the descriptive category "configuration". We already
know that from a canonical point of view, a (thematic, linguistic, visual, ...) con-
figuration can be interpreted as a structured whole that consists of a (not
necessarily finite) set of dimensions and functions that introduce some kind of
order ben¡een dimensions.
In this sense, there is a strong equivalency between a structural con-
figurational description and the formal structure of conceptual graphs that
enables us to directly translate a given descriptive metalanguage into the format
of conceptual graphs: configurational dimensions map to the set of concept-types,
referential values of configurational dimensions map to the set of instances or
values, and thematic functions map to the set of conceptual relations.











MOTIF: 'Virgin Mary holding in her arms the cru-
cified Christ"
the following conceptual graph corresponds:
[sculprunE: "sr.atuette"] 
-(char) a- IIERIOD:'§othic"](char) a- [UATE.RIAL:'\vood"](char) a- [CHRoMATICS: "monochrome"](char) a- IDATING: "l4th century"l(char) <- [UOff: 'Virgin Mary holding in her arms the crucified
Christ".
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The equivalence between a configurational descriptive metalanguage and the
representation system of conceptual graphs is not only interesting for purely
representational objectives, i.e., for the search of an adequate artificial and well-
defined language that expresses a description, but also 
-and maybe much more-
because of the fact that conceptual graphs have an explicit mathematical or
formal background.
In introducing the theory of conceptual graphs, we have given a more set-
oriented and functional account of graphs.
Sowa has also shown that conceptual graphs can be translated or mapped,
wiü the help of the operator (function) (D, into the first order predicate calculus:
"ff u is any conceptual graph, then Ou is a formula determined by the
following construction:
* If u contains & generic concepts, assign a distinct variable s,ymbol xt, x2, ... xh
to each one.
* For each concept c of u, let idzntifer (c) be the variable assigned to c if c is
generic or refrmt(c) if c is individual.
* Represent each concept c as a monadic predicate whose name is the same as
tlpe(c) and whose argument is idcntifir(c).
* Represent each nadic conceptual relation r of u as an z-adic predicate
whose name is the same as t1pft). For each i from 7 to n, let üe ith
argument of the predicate be the identifier of the concept linked to the ith
arc of r.
* Then Ou has a quantifir prefix )x1, f*r, ... 3x¡ and a bodl consisting of the
conjunction of all the predicates for the concepts and conceptual relations of
2." (Sowa 1984: 86).
Let us see by means of the conceptual graph representing the thematic
description of the statuette how this mapping process works:
* there are six concepts, all of them are individual concepts that possess a
specified value;











CHAR (statuette, I 4th_cen tury)
CTIAR ( statuette, sain t_mary_hold in g_in_her_arms_the_crucifi ed_christ)
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* üe six monadic and the five dyadic predicates constitute togeüer the body
u of iD that does not possess, in our case, quantiñer prefixes given the fact that all
our monadic predicates have in their argument position referent(c), viz. a
constant:
(SCULPTURE (statuette) n CHAR (statuette, gothic) 
" 






^ CHROMATISM (monochrome) ^ CHAR (statuette, l4th_century) " DATING(14th_century) 
^ 
CHAR (statuette, saint_mary_holding_üe_crucified_chris.-in_her_
arms) n MOTIF ( sain t_mary_holding_in_he r_arms_üe_crucified_christ) .
In the example concerning some characteristic features of a hawk, üere are
nvo generic concepts []IA!vI(l and [merHER]. Mapped into a logical formula, the
graph representing that description looks like this:
3x 3y (IIAWK(x) 
" 
CHAR (x,80 cm) 
^ 









CFIAR (y, brown) 
^ 
COLOUR (brown)).
The possibility of mapping a configurational descriptive metalanguage into
the representation system of conceptual graphs and the possibility of mapping
conceptual graphs into logical formulae have three important consequences for
knowledge representation (latu smsu).
l) They show that there could exist a strong equivalency between
description, representation and formalization or, again, between a descriptive
metalanguage, a representational or expressive metalanguage and a formal
metalanguage. In other words, even if we adopt a structural or a pragmatic point
of view in (thematic, linguistic, ...) knowledge description, it is not 
-as it has been
often argued- in contradiction with formally or logically oriented theories of
knowledge representation. What is, contrarily, important here, is the assumption
that the formalization of a knowledge-object applies to a description or
schematization of such a knowledge-object and not to the object itself
(concerning the interpretation of the correspondencies between '\¡vorlds'
(domains of reference), models, and formal languages, see especially Pedersen
1993). What one formalizes is not the object iself but a theory of the
object. In this sense, it should be intuitively clear, too, that representational
and formal tools like (augmented) transition networks or dags (i.e., directed
acyclic graphs), which are commonly used in computational linguistics, rely
heaüly on the descriptive quality of the linguistic theory they use in order
to analyze (to understand and to generate) linguistic knowledge. Like conceptual
graphs, they could be mapped into logical formulae. It is not so much
logics 
-even standard logicr that are questionable here but much more the
descriptive quality of theories of a domain of reference. The principal cond,ition in
ord.q to cort|ute a d,esoiption is that it must exhiüt a configuratiqnal or structural
organization.
P. Stockin ger,/ Conceptual analysis 27
2) There has been a lot of criticism of semantic or conceptual networks,
especially concerning the notion of "semantics" iself as it is used in those
approaches. As it has been argued, semantic and conceptual networks seem
rather to describe syntactic structures of labels or figures which have a meaning
only for us because we can intuitively interpret them on the background of
theories or conventions to which üey are referred by ourselves but which are not
integrated explicitly in semantic or conceptual networks. It is only in logic that
you can find an explicit theory of semantics given mainly in terms of
interpretation and evaluation functions that map formulae to models or '\,vorlds"
in which they receive truth-values. Conceptual graph theory incorporates a
model-üeoretic component. As Sowa has pointed out, one of the most simple
ways to imagine an abstract model in which formulae have to be evaluated is a
relational database. A query behaves like the projection of a conceptual graph or
its corresponding logical formula onto the model of the relational database and
the evaluation of that graph in the given model by the means of a special
denotation operator (or function) 6 (for further explications see Sowa (1984:
161-173) ).
3) From an implementational point of view, the possibility of mapping
conceptual graphs in logical formulae is of great interest because it ensures their
almost direct use in the form of structured objects, terms or clauses in logical
programming languages. Nevertheless, the implementation of conceptual graphs
is not bound to languages like PRoLoc 
-it is only a historical conjuncture üat has
put them together.
3) Partially Ordqed Hiaarchies of C,onJiguraüons, Confgurational Dimensioru, and
h nfi gura ti o n a I Fun c ti o ns
As we have already seen, (thematic) configurations should not be understood as
simple onedimensional schemas but much more in terms of compounded
modules (which are, themselves, configurations) that possess a greater or lesser
degree of generality or specificity and which could be (at least partially)
instantiated by some values in a given domain of reference.
Therefore, one of the most important questions is how to define the
constructional principles and rules that govern a (thematic) configuration. In
interpreting a (thematic) configuration in terms of a conceptual graph or in
terms of a set of conceptual graphs, rve rvill norv discuss in a more formal way
some basic constructional principles which are developed in Sowa 1984.
Configurational dimensions that are mapped into concept-types are defined,
in the theory of conceptual graphs, by the means of partially ordered type
hierarchies.
From a formal point of view, a partially ordered tlpe hierarchy of three given
dimensions s, t, and u relies on the follorving assumptions:
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"l) If s ( t, then s is called a subtype of t; and t is called a supertype of s, writren r
)5.
2) If sl t and s* t, then s is called a proper subtype of t,written s< t; and tis
called a proper supertFpe of s, written t > s.
3) If s is a subtype of t and a subtype of u (s < t and s ( u), then s is called a com-
mon subtype of t and u.
4) If sisa supertFpe of tand asupertype of u (s) tands)u), then s is called a
common supertype of t and u." (Sowa 1984: 80)
The theory of partially ordered hierarchies is based on some fundamental
mathematical properties of relations as, for instance, reflexivity, irreflexivity,
symmetry, asymmetry, antisymmetry and transitivity. The partial ordering, in this
sense, is a binary relation that is reflexive, antisymmetric as well as transitive.
The well-known relation "is-a', generally used in artificial intelligence and
knowledge representation in order to formalize type hierarchies wiü (multiple)
inheritance of properties from supertypes to subtypes, is a special case of partially
ordered hierarchies which are defined as latüces.
In a very elementary way, a lattice possesses an infimum (a greatest lower
bound) of nvo types s and t which is defined by their intersection (u < s n t) and a
supremum (a least upper bound) which is defined by their union (u > s v t).
Sowa calls the infimum the "maximal common subrype" of the types s and t and
the supremum the "minimal common supertype" of s and t (1984:82). For
example, given a certain description, the supremum of both lexical units
"terrestrial vehicle" and "shipping vehicle" is "vehicle"; its infimum is "amphibious
vehicle".
In knowledge representation, we assume, furthermore, that all lattices are
bound, even if this is not necessarily true from a purely mathematical point of
view. A bound lattice L possesses a so-called universal tFpe T ("at the top" of a
lattice) and a so-called absurd type I ("at the bottom" of a lattice) and for any
type t in L the condition T> t> I is true.
As Sowa has pointed out, the definition of a lattice L by the means of
intersection and union of types in L, shows a strong similariry with the definitions
of relations benveen sets. So, a set-theoretical interpretation of a lattice defines
the universal type T as the universal set I of all subsets with the subset relation C
as the partially ordered hierarchy-relation and the absurd rype a as üe empry set
{}.
The theory of partially ordered type hierarchies not only can account for üe
formalism of directed acyclic graphs as used in computational linguistics but also
makes clearer the implicit formal theories that are handled by the most
prominent lexicological relations as, for instance, the relation of synonymy,
(gradual or categorial) antonymy, hyponymy and hyperonymy or presupposition
(complementariry).
Let us assume f,, { } and G as well as three concepts or "features" x, y, and z; x
belonging to the setS (i.e.: {x lx e S}, ybelonging to the setT{y lye T} and z
belonging to the set U {z I z e U}.
P. Stockinger,/ C.onceptual analysis 29
Hyponymy and hyperonymy describe nothing other than a (partially ordered)
relation between x in S and y in Twith x as the proper supertype of y and y as the
proper subtype ofx.
Gradual antonymy (or, as Greimas called it, contrarity) depicts a relation
betneenxin Sandyin Tin alatticeconstrained byL { }and e thathaveeither
a supremum z in U (defined by their 
-possible- union) or an infimum z in U(defined by their 
-possible- intersection) or both.
Categorial antonymy (üe relation of contradiction, in the sense of Greimas)
depicts a relation of pure difference between x and / (i.e.: ly I y e T and y E S)
and{xlxe Sandxe T} ).(Unilateral)Presupposition or complementarity depicts a relation of
complementation where x belongs to the universal set » but not to the set S (i.e.:{xlxe Iandnotxe S}).
Given a configurational description represented by a (set of) conceptual
graph(s), the theory of partially ordered hierarchies permits several basic
operations on dimensions in that configuration as, for instance, üe specification
of a (set of) dimension(s), the generalization of a (set of) dimension(s), the copy
of (a set of) dimensions which is a central operation in the construction in the
derivation of conceptual graphs, as well as the evaluation of üe proximity or the
approximation of nvo given dimensions in a given configuration.
ln other words, üe theory of partially ordered hierarchies permits the explicit
performance of several fundamental types of operations not only on description
of thematic knowledge but also on descriptions of linguistic or non-linguistic
(visual, ...) knowledge or on descriptions concerning more specially üe level of
the structural organization of a document.
The often discussed problem of the lexical access in psycholinguistics or again
the relationship of association between a given term and several other terms in
information and documentation sciences are, for instance, only rwo special cases
of the approximation of (sets o0 (thematic, lexical, ...) dimensions in a lattice of
a given configuration. The major problem here is how to construct an explicit
and empirically appropriate description in which the approximation between
(sets of) dimensions takes place.
Conceptual relations representing configurational functions of a given
description can also be handled by the formal theory of partially ordered
hierarchies. In assuming "at the top" of a lattice some general relation, it is
possible to define more specific conceptual relations where the condition holds
that a type of relation r is of the same type of relation s if r and s share exactly üe
same number of arcs.
In thematic as well as in lexico-semantic knowledge representation, there are
some major types of relations that are frequently used: casual or actantial
relations, spatio-temporal relations as well as relations of quantification and
qualification.
Casual or actantial relations position configurational dimensions with respect
to the functional roles they play in an actiüty, action or process. Spatio-temporal
relations localize configurational dimensions with respect to roles they play in
space and time. Relations of quantification and qualification determine rhe
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several modalities of the existence of configurational dimensions by "secondary"
dimensions that play üe role of "quantifiers" or "qualifiers".
Given such a rudimentary "ontology" of configurational functions, there are
nvo possible strategies in order for using them in knowledge representation.
The first one consists in determining a very small set of "canonical"
configurational functions which is used indifferently for all particular
configurational organizations that may structure a descriptive model. For
instance, in the set of actantial relations, the relation of "agentiüry" may be solely
defined by the fact that one configurational dimension is at the source of üe
existence of another configurational dimension, no matter if the first
configurational dimension is animate or inanimate, if it is characterizable by an
intentional or teleological (goal-oriented) force, or again no matter if the segond
configurational dimension describes a (physical or mental) process, a generic
activiry or an action. A greater importance is given, here, to a more systematic
description of configurational dimensions as well as to the operations of
configurational abstraction and contextualization.
The second strategy consists, contrarily, in the definition of subsets of more
specialized configurational functions that constrain, indeed, to a greater or lesser
extent the identity of the configurational dimensions to which they apply.
The casual function of "causality" could be, in this sense, dissociated into a
function of "causaliry stricto sensu", a function of "non-intentional agentivity", a
function of "intentional agentivity" or again a function of "teleological agentivity"
rvith theoretical stipulations like the following 
-partial- ones: "causality stricto
sensu" requires an inanimate physical or abstract entity as the causing
configurational dimension; "non-intentional agentivity" requires an animate
entity as a configurational dimension that does not control the causing of another
configurational dimension; "intentional agentiüty" requires an animate entity as a
configurational dimension that controls the causing of another configurational
dimension but 
-contrarily to the function of "teleological agentivity"- without its
insertion in a goal-oriented plan structure.
In the same way, it is possible to define a given primitive function of
localization in space and time in more and more specified relations that take into
account the dimensionality of space and time, their topology or again their
relativity with respect to the position and orientation of configurational
dimensions.
This second strategy which is, from a structural and morpho-dynamic point of
view, more adequate than the first one, assumes the hypothesis that the "gestalt"
of a configuration is much more the result of the interactions of configurational
functions than a mere assembly of independently existing entities via some
relations. Therefore, from a descriptive and conceptual point of view, a large
amount of work consists in the isolation and definition of configurational
functions that constrain and motivate configurational patterns.
Let us mention only that the theory of partially ordered hierarchies can be
applied, too, to ses of whole configurations represented by graphs that permit us
to distinguish them with respect to their specificity, generality, or their proximiry
(Sowa 1984).
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4) Tlu R¿a.trsiue Defniüon of a *t of Configurations
3l
Let us take the description of action-types and plan structures as, for instance, of
the evolution of a crisis in some geographical region. As Schank and Abelson
(1976) have already argued, there are several levels ofdescription and knowledge
rePresentation.
There is a first, rather general, level where one introduces only non-specified
plan structures and basic actions, like the obtaining of someüing which is
claimed at the beginning of a crisis and some condensed propositionJike
descriptions that label out several interaction-patterns, like BARGAIN, THREATEN,
PH\§ICAL{ONTROL, and so on, which are instrumental actions with respect to the
basic action OBTAIN(x), where the variable x stands for the claimed object.
On a second level, the condensed interaction patterns receive a general
definition and the plan motivating oBTAIN(x) would be organized in some major
plan-structures. As in the structural analysis of folk tales, the named interaction
pattern PH!§ICAL{ONTROL could be decomposed in a series of rypical actions
like ATTACK, OCCUPY, COUNTER-ATTACK, DEFEAT, and so on. To each action type
will be associated a typical description containing the most prominent action
roles, the object of the action, a localization grid or a slot for instruments that are
used. Concerning the more refined description of the plan motivating the basic
action OBTAIN(x), it will be dissociated in several "named plans" (Schank and
Abelson 1976) accounting for the fact that the evolution of a crisis could be
resolved by purely discursive and political means as bargaining, by military means,
by means of arbitrations by a third party, and so on. Note, nevertheless, that it is
not necessary to give a complete account of all possible interaction patterns and
named plans 
-this is not even possible because of the essentially "open' historical
nature of the described object "crisis". As we will see again, there are at least two
strategies in conceptual graph theory 
-type definition and schematic definition of
contextualized configurations 
-that allow a given knowledge description to be
completed or modified.
On a third (fourth, ...) level, the described interaction patterns as well as the
named plans would receive even more detailed descriptions. For instance, üe
interaction patterns could be decomposed in a series of statedescriptions that
succeed one another or that are combined with more constraining relations like
those that define counterfactual patterns, conditional patterns or probability
patterns. On that level, it rvould also be possible to define several variants of a
typical interaction pattern.
These different levels and components of the description of an object form
-informally speaking- a huge and complex thematic configuration composed of a
certain number of sets of more or less general or specific thematic configurations
that are referenced to parts of the described object. In oüer words, they raise the
problem of the represmtatiue set(s) of 
-in our case- thematic configurations.
As we have already argued, it is rather impossible, impracticable and, from an
operational point of view, even undesirable to enumerate the whole rep-
resentative set(s) of (thematic) configuration(s). We should instead look for the
rules that permit us to generate such a representative set of configurations, to
32 LENGUAS MODERNAS 20, 1993
introduce new information in a given set of configurations as well as ensure that a
given set of configurations conforms to a certain point of view or context. If \ive
want to elaborate a descriptive model of a knowledge standard that conforms to
these requirements, we have to deal with the problems of canonical configurations
in a representative set of configurations and t}:.e formation tul¿s by the means of
which we can derive all configurations in the representative set.
In order to start a more systematic investigation into these problems, which
we have to resolve in describing a knowledge standard, let us assume the
following small and rather simple set of conceptual graphs:
1) [slno] q-(6[¡¿¡)- [coLoUR](char)- IWEIGHT: @*](char)- [SIZE: @*]
2) [BIRD] <-(part_o¡¡- [BoDY_PART](char)- [st{ApE]
3) [rreru¡n: { * } ] <-(loc)- [BoDY_PART](char)- [col-ouR]
4) [BIRD] a-(!s_a)- [I"{RUS](is_a)_ lsrrnNe]
5) [TARUS] 4-(i5_¿)- [COMrvfON_cULL](is_a)_ [GTAUCOUS_GULL]
6) [STERNA] a-(i5_¿)- [SANDWrCH_TERN](is_a)- [ARCTIC_TERN]
7) [BoDY_PARr1 a-(is_a)- IHEAD](is_a)_ IBoDY](is_a)- [wlNc: l* I @ 2)(is_a)- [rArL](is_a)_[LEG:{*l@2)
These seven graphs constitute what is called a canonical basis or a set of
canonical thematic configurations. The first graph stipulates that a bird is
characterized by its (general) colour, its weight and its size. The second graph
asserts that a bird is "composed" of body-parts that are characterized by a shape.
The third graph asserts that the feathers are Iocalized by a body-part and üat they
are characterized by a colour. The fourth graph assumes üat üe both species
"larus" and "sterna" are birds. The fifth graph assumes üat üe common gull and
the glaucous gull belong to the species "larus'whereas the sixth graph assumes
that the arctic tern and the sandwich tern belong to the species "sterna". The
sevenü graph asserts that the head, the body, the tail as well as the two wings and
legs are body-parts.
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The seven graphs decompose quite simple and general descriptions of several
physical aspects of birds as one can meet them in non-specialized guide-books of
üe world of birds. From an empirical point a üew, the canonical basis is not at all
exhaustive. It takes into account, for instance, two species of birds, it speaks in a
quite general sense of the body-pars and the colouring of feaüers, and so on.
This fact does not represent an inconvenience because, as we have already
confirmed and as we will see later on, new information or more pertinent
information could be introduced in the canonical basis, as derived graphs or by
the means of (contextdependent) definitions.
The important point here is that the canonical basis introduces explicit
constraints that have to be respected if some graph representing a üematic
configuration could be interpreted in or with the help of the set of configurations
that are derivable from the given canonical basis. In this sense, a graph
representing a description like this one:
IBIRDI q-(6[¡¿¡)- [METAL]
(char)- [srzE]
would be rejected or, more precisely, would not be interpreted as a well-formed
graph given the fact that there is no information in the canonical basis that
stipulates that a bird is characterized by the dimension "metal". As in generative
grammar, canonical graphs impose sel¿ctional constraints which permit us to
distinguish between arbitrary and meaningful graphs.
From a pragmatic point of üew, the canonical basis of graphs introduces
some fundamental assumptions concerning the lnel of rel.nancy of a description
given a context of application. In this sense, a canonical basis can change from
one context of application to another. The formal problem here is how to handle
these changes 
-a problem which claims a theory of epistemic revision, in üe
sense of Gardenfors (1988) or in the context of a game-theoretical semantics
(Hintikka and Kulas 1985).
There are four canonicalforvnation rules for deriving a conceptual graph g from
one, two or n conceptual graphs which are themselves either canonical graphs or
already derived graphs:
1) ¡}ae rul¿ of copl: a conceptual graph u is identical to a graph w;
2) the rul¿ of restricüon"'for any concept c in [graph] u, type(c) may be replaced
by a subtype; if c is generic, its referent may be changed to an indiüdual
marker. These changes are permitted only if referent(c) conforms to type(c)
before and after the change" (Sowa 1984:94);
3) the rub of join: "if a concept c in [graph] u is identical to a concept d in
[graph] v, then let [graph] w be the graph obtained by deleting d and linking
to c all arcs of conceptual relations that had been linked to d" (Sowa 1984:
e4);
4) the rul¿ of simpliJication: "if conceptual relations r and s in üe graph u are
duplicates, then one of them may be deleted from [graph] u together wiü all
its arcs" (Sowa 1984: 94).
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The rule of copy plays a central role in üe generalization of the description
of an object represented by a graph which is defined by the operation of the
projection (cf. infra).
The rule of restriction may, given its definition, apply to the restriction of
concept-tyPes:
IBIRD] -==(is restricted to)===> [STERNA],
to the instantiation of a generic concept-tFpe:
[ARCTIC-TERN: x] === (is restricted to) ==-¡ [ARCTIC-TERN: "leslie "],
as well as to both simultaneously:
[rrno: x] ===(is iestricted to)=--, [STERNA] -==(is restricted to)==-¡
IARCTIC-TER§ ] === (is restricted to) ==-¡ IARCTIC-TERN: "leslie "] .
The rule of restriction is defined by the theory of partially ordered rype
hierarchies as well as by the operation of conformation between a generic
concept and is referent.
The most important rule is the rule ofjoin that permits the concatenation of
two or more (canonical or derived) graphs in order to produce a new graph. Let
us take the first tlvo canonical graphs:
1) [sIR.o] q-(6[¡¿¡)- [CoLoUR](char)- IWEIGHT: @ *](char)- [srzE: @ x]
2) [BIRD] <-(par'_o$- [BoDY_PART](char)- [SHArE]
By applying the rule of join to the concept [BIRD] that appears in both
graphs, we obtain a new derived graph w:
IBIRDI a-(sh¿¡)- [CoLoUR](char)- [wErcHT: @ *](char)- ISIZE: @ *]
( part_of¡ 
- 
[ Bo DY_PART ](char¡- [sHApE]
This new graph stipulates something like this: a bird is characterized by its
colour, its weight, its size and it is "composed" of body-parts that are characterized
by their shape.
The graph w is quite easily derivable from the canonical basis. But in
combining the different formation rules, we could derive much more interesting
graphs representing configurations that are rather appropriate to the description
of physical aspects of some particular subspecies of bird or to some concrete
specimen of a given sub-species. Let us consider the following graph w:
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[ARoTIC_TERN : "leslie'] a- ( 6[¡¿¡) 
- 
[COtOun:'\r,hite " ]
(char)- [WntCffr: "12 p")
(char)- [SIZE: .80 cm"]
(poss)- [wruc: l*l@ t] a-(char)- [SIIAPE](loc)-¡ [TEATHER]
(char)- ICOLOUX:'fuhite_and_blue"]
(poss)- [TAIL] a-(sh¿¡)- [SHAPE](loc)-¡ [TEATHER]
(char)- [COtOUn:'\vhite"]
This graph asserts üat there is an arctic tern wiü the name Leslie, üat Leslie
is a white bird, that it weighs 12 pounds, that it has a size of 80 cm, that üe
feathers of its wings are white and blue, that üe feathers of its tail are white and
the shapes of its wings and its tail remain unspecified.
Now let us see how we can derive this conceptual graph from the canonical
basis. There are three principal phases:
l) There is a first process of derivation leading from üe first, fourü and sixth
canonical graph 81,84, and 96 to the graph r:
gl: [urno] a-(sh¿¡)- [coroun](char)_ IWEIGHT: @ *](char)- [sIzE: @ *]
ga [BIRDI a-(is_¿)- [IARUS](is-a)- ISTERNA]
96 [STERNAI a-(is_a)- ISANDMCH_TERN](is_a)- IARCTIC_TERN]
r: [ancuc_tERN: "leslie"] q-( char)- [CoLoUR:'\rhite"](char)_ lwglcnr: ,,12 p"](cha¡)- [SIZE: '80 cm"]
This process requires üe following operations:
i) join benveen üe first and üe fourth graph on üe position of [BIRD] (graph
i);
ii) restriction of graph i to the concept [STERNA] (graph ii);
iii) join of graph ii with the sixth graph on üe position [STERNA] (graph iii);
iv) restriction of graph iii to üe concepr lencuc_rrnu] (graph iv);
v) restriction of the generic concept [ARCTIC-TERN) in graph iv to an indiüdual
concepr [encuc_rrnN: 'leslie"] (g.aph v); and
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vi) three repeated restrictions in graph v that relate the referent '\.vhite" to the
generic concept [CoLoUR] , the referent "l2 p'to üe generic concept
[WEIGHT], and the referent "80 cm" to the generic concept [szE,] (graph r).
2) There is a second derivation process (which is almost identical with the first
one) leading from the second, third, and seventh canonical graph to the graph s:
92: [nno] <-(part_og- [rooY_PART](char)- [SHAPE]
93: [mernER, { * ¡ I a-(loc)- [BoDY_PART](char)- [CoLoUR]
g7: [loov_renT] <-(is_a)- IHEAD](is_a)_ [BoDY](is_a)_ [wrNc: {* } @ 2](is_a)- [rArL](is_a)-[l¡c:{*l@2)
s: [slRo] <-(part_o¡¡- [wING: l* | @ 2)(loc)-¡ [TEATHER]
(char) 
- 
[CotOun:'fuhite_and_blue"](part-ofl- [TAIL] (loc)-¡ IFEATHER](char)- [COrOUn:'\uhite"]
The second derivation process requires the following operations:
a) join between the second and the third canonical graph on the position of
IBoDY_PARTJ (graph a);
b) join of graph a with the seventh canonical graph on the position
IBoDY_PARTJ (graph b);
c) repeated restriction of the concept [BODY_PART] in graph b to the two proper
subtypes [wrNc: { * } @ 2] and ITAIL] (graph c); and
d) repeated restrictions that conform the generic concept [CoLoUR] in graph c
to its corresponding referents '\uhite and blue" if it is Iocalized on the wings,
'\uhite" if it is localized on the tail.
3) Finally, üere is ajoin benveen graph r and s and, simultaneously, a restriction
of the concepr [BIRD] in s to the individual concept [ARCTIC_TERN: "leslie"] üat
produce üe graph w.
The thematic configuration represented by the graph w constitutes a set of
canonical and derived descriptions by üe means of which we ¡ssert some physical
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¿rspects of a particular arctic tern called Leslie. Even if we have not given a direct
account of üe description of the physical aspects of this bird, we are able to
derive it from a small basis of canonical graphs representing quite general
thematic configurations üat behave like autonomous, internally structured
¡nodubs that interact and transform themselves following the four formation
rules.
The interaction and transformation of quite simple, internally structured and
general modules is one of the most prominent doctrines of üe object-oriented
approach of knowledge representation (lato smxt\ in artificial intelligence (Cox
1987, Masimi et al. 1989, Ferber 1990, Rumbaugh et al. l99l).
The practical idea that underlies this vision is to construct a relatively small set
of gmeral (and gnaic, see below) configurational descriptions called "libraries"
that are reusable in a great variety of applications. In deriüng more and more
specified "libraries" from the first general (and generic) ones, by the means of
some basic "m¿thoü" (formation rules) and other more specified methods, one
could generate a conccptual library-code that describes in an appropriate way üe
information from a knowledge source which is relevant in a given context of
application. Knowledge description by üe means of configurational entities and
knowledge representation and formalization with conceptual graphs seem to us
to be the appropriate way to realize this idea (see also Thayse 1989, Stockinger
r993).
As Sowa has pointed out, the technique used to produce a derived graph
representing a set of canonical and,/or already derived (thematic) configurations,
as well as to prove that a given graph derives from a set of canonical graphs, is the
bchnigue of reanrsiae minductiae dzfinition:
"First a small starting set of elements is given.
Then some operations are specified for generating new elements of the set
from old elements.
Finally, the set is defined to be the set containing the starting elements, all
others that can be derived from them by repeated application of the
generating operations, and no other elements not so derivable.
The set resulting from these operations is said to be the closure of the starting
set under the given generating operations" (Sowa 1984: 369).
The small starting set is given by the basis of canonical graphs; the generating
operations are constituted by the principal formation rules, and the closure of the
starting set is the set containing all derivable graphs, and no other graphs not so
derivable.
The four canonical formation rules are in fact rulzs of specifcation of canonical
graphs. They produce new graphs that represent (thematic) configurations which
are more specific üan the configurations from which they are derivable. As Sowa
has shown, üe theory of partially ordered hierarchies also applies to entire sets of
conceptual graphs and notjust to concepts and conceptual relations (Sowa 1984:
96-103).
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5) Gqreralization and Deduction of C,onfiguratioru
Given üe formal possibility of defining a partially ordered hierachy over sets of
graphs, we need not only operations of specification of (thematic) configurations
represented by conceptual graphs but also operations of gmeralizaúioz that allow
us to elicit more general knowledge from more specific knowledge.
The operation of generalization is called a projection of a graph v in a graph u.
The Greek letter n is used to express a projection operator which has the
following properties:
"For each concept c in v, nc is a concept in rcv where type(nc) -< type(c). If c is
indiüdual, then referent(c) = referent(nc).
For each conceptual relation r in v, ¡r is a conceptual relation in rw where
rype(zrr) = type(r). If the ith arc of r is linked to a concePt c in v, the ¿'th arc ofÍr must be linked to rc in lw" (Sowa 1984: 99).
Let us take the three canonical graphs from which we have derived the
graph r.
91: [rrno] q-(6trar)- [CoLoUR](char)- [wErcHT: @ *](char)- [SrzE: @ *]
ga: [BIRD] a-(ls_¿)- II-IIRUS](is_a)_ [srERNA]
96: [srrnNel q-(is_a)- [SAND\{rCH_TERN](is_a)_ [ARCTTC_TERN]
r: [enCttC_fERN:'leslie'] q-(char)- [CoLOUR:'\vhite"](char)- [WftCUt: "12 p"J(char)- [SIZE: ,,90 cm,,]
Given the specialization/generalization hierarchy of graphs following the line
IBIRD] < [sfEnNe] < [ARCTIC_TERN], the graph r is the mosr specialized graph of
all:
* The projection of 96 in r is 9'6: IARCTIC_TERN] restricted to an individual
concePt.
* The projection of 94 in 96 is g'4: [STERNA] restricted to üe proper sub.
type [ARcTIC_TERN].
* The projection of g1 in 94 is g'l: IBIRD] which is a copy of 9"4.
* The projection of gl in r is g"1 
-the whole graph- where is generic con-
cepts are restricted to indiüdual concepts.
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Every graph üat derives from another graph is a specialization of the latter
and must therefore "contain" it as a subgraph that is necessarily more general
than the entire graph. Projections of any more general graphs into more
specialized ones are neither necessarily one-tmne (it may happen üat two
different concepts or conceptual relations become equivalent in the goal domain
of the projection or üceversa) nor necessarily unique (there may be several
different projections from one more general graph into a more specialized
graph).
As Fargues and Catach (1985) and Fargues et al. (1986) have pointed out, the
operation of projection is closely related to the unification or rnapping formalisrn
üat is used as a resolution mechanism in logical programming languages:
'This (revised, P.S.) matching operation is defined as follows: We say üat a
graph v can be matched to a graph u if there exists a subgraph u' of u such
that:
+ the conceptual relations are the same in v and u',
+ if the concepts c¡ and c; (respectively, d¡ and d;) are linked by the
conceptual relation r in u (respectively in v), then, in the pairs (c¡, d¡) and
(c¡, d¡) the first and the second concepts must be compatible (i.e., two
concePts are compatible if üere exiss a maximal common restriction ca of c1
and c2 wiü the following conditions: c3 ( cl, c3 ( c2, and ca * I)" (Fargues
et al. 1986: 77).
6) The Dcfinition of New Configurations, Configurational Dimensions, and
hnfigurational Functions
As we have already seen, one of üe major problems in knowledge description and
representation is that it is intrinsically impossible to conceive a description of an
object that would not keep any trace of the point of üew from which it is created,
of the contexts for which it should be valid or that could determine, once and
for all, all possible changes, transformations or evolutions of its object of
reference.
The practical consequence is that a knowledge base must be conceived in
such a way üat it can be adapted (or that it can adapt itsel$ to new knowledge, to
knowledge that changes or to knowledge üat is relevant only in some contexts.
For several years, a Iot of formal research has been done in the field of
dynamic and partial models, especially in the so<alled non-standard logics and in
formal semantics (Barwise and Perry 1983, Hintikka and Kulas 1985, Gardenfors
1988, Martin 1987, Nef 1988, Gregoire 1990). Almost all of this research tries to
give a formal account of changing circumstances or contexts, of particular points
of üew or (mutual) epistemic states üat influence the validiry of a description of
some object üat itself evolves in time and in interaction wiü other objects.
Conceptual graph theory is totally compatible with these approaches.
Following Hintikka et al. as well as Barwise and Perry, Sowa himself has sketched
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out a game-theoretical and situated ("circumstantial") approach of knowledge
representation in the framework of conceptual graphs.
We do not have time here to discusss more systematically the interest of these
new theories for knowledge description and representation; we must restrict
ourselves to a relatively basic investigation of possible issues that concern the
problem of changes in given (thematic) configurations that describe some object
of reference.
There are three basic possibilities for modi$ing a given knowledge base of
conceptual graphs representing a set of (thematic) configurations:
I ) the introduction of new conceptual graphs into the canonical basis;
2) the definition of new concept types and conceptual relations;
3) the attunement of the validity of a (thematic) configuration to a context by
the means of nested graphs.
-the first possiüü$ is rather simple because it consists only in the enriching of
a given set of canonical graphs by new graphs. The introduced new graphs,
naturally, must be compatible with the existing ones.
The second possibility, the definition of new concept tFpes and conceptual
relations, is performed by the operation of abstraction (designated by the Greek
letter l,) which maps an abstract canonical graph onto a graph u.
Let us take an example. In our set of thematic configurations describing
physical aspects of various species of birds, we have taken into account only the
fact that the several body parts of a bird are covered with feathers. Now, it is quite
possible that somebody wants to obtain some more precise information about a
particular type of feather like, for instance, the remex, the tectrix or the down of
a bird.
In order to satisry such a request, there is the possibility of defining a new
concept or a new (thematic) dimension which 
-when unfolded- constitutes an
entire graph representing new and appropriate knowledge about is object of
reference. The introduction, for instance, of the new concept type [REMEX] will
be as follows:
rypeREMEx(x) is
IFEATHER: *xl q-(loc)- [wrNG: {* | @ 2)(qty)-, [NUMBER](char)-¡ [SIZE]'
This definition stipulates that the remex is a feather which is located on both
wings, üat there is a certain quantiry of such feathers and that they may also be
characterized by their (morphological) size.
The definition procedure is written as follows:
t¡pe t(c) ís u.
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'Typ.'signifies üat the definition introduces a new concePt type, the expression
"t' identifies the name of the new concept, "u' is the graph called the body onto
which the abstraction is mapped and "c" specifies üe formal parameter üat links
the new concept t)?e to a generic concept in the body.
In our example, "t" refers to REMEX, "u" is üe graph by the means of which
REMEX is defined and "c" corresponds to the symbol "*x" speci{flng that in this
definition [rnernEn] functions as a formal parameter. Simultaneously, it
specifies, too, that REMEX will be handled as a subtype of FEATHER in a given
partially ordered hierarchy of (thematic) dimensions or (thematic) con-
figurations. \
As Sowa has shown, the procedure of the definition of new concept types
corresponds closely to the logical procedure of abstraction given by the lambda
calculus (Sowa 1984: 105, Thayse et al. 1989).
The procedure of typedefinition can be extended to üe definition of new
conceptual relations. This is an interesting possibility given that from some
hypothetically basic üematic functions we can systematically construct even more
complex functions which apply only to quite particular kinds of (thematic)
configurations.
For instance, one may:ssume a basic function called "link" that can apply as a
kind of default relation to all tlpes of dimensions in a given configuration, i.e.:
IDIMENSIoN] 
-(li¡¡[)-¡ [»tunNsIoN ] .In introducing more specified dimensions, the basic function "link" can be
restricted to more appropriate functions that possess a syntactical behaüour that
agrees wiü the structural organization of these dimensions. This üsion is near to
that which prevails in localistic case-theory (Gruber 1976, Anderson 1971,
Jackendoff 1983, Descles 1985, Petitot 1985, and others) assuming some basic
spatio-temporal and actantial cases that can be enriched by more specific
parameters growing out of the specific structural organization of a certain type of
(thematic) configurations. Sowa, for instance, proposes the following definition
of the casual function "agent":
relation AGNT(x, y) is [ecr: *¡] a-(link)- [rNrlTyl-(link)-¡ [ANIMATE:
*Yl (Sowa 1984: l14).
In using üis new relation, we can represent the graph u:
u: [eer] <-(link)- [nNrIry¡-(link)-¡ [eensoN: "paul"]
by the graph v:
v: [naf1-(agnt)-¡ [pfRSOt¡: "paul"].
There is much interest in using the procedure of the definition of new
(thematic) functions represented by conceptual relations. As we have already
mentioned, it systematizes the constn¡ction of more and more specified functions
as, for instance, actantial functions or functions of spatio-temporal localization. In
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using that strategy, we are not committed to the creation of an uncontrollable
open list of functions or relations as is often the case in caseoriented semantic
theories.
Functions or relations that are explicitly defined cannot apply to any
configuration but only to those that display a structural organization üat is
compatible wiü üem. In this sense, the systematic elaboration of more and more
specified functions or relations derivable from some basic ones is very close to the
philosophy and epistemology of gestalt theory and structuralism.
The strategy of defining even more specific and specialized functions using
certain basic functions or relations would seem to be fruitful for combined
projects that have to deal with natural language processing as well as with what is
called expert knowledge as it is, for instance, accessible in written or spoken
documents. Normally, in lexical semantics and linguistics, üe set of used cases for
the construction of llxical subcategorization framls is quite limited and general.
But the same cases could not be used directly for the description of expert (or
'\uorld") knowledge because üey are too general or underspecified. For instance,
the relation "agent" as deñned in the upper graph cannot draw a difference
between purely agentive and teleological roles that we need if we want to reason
about plan-structures; it cannot distinguish between a community of specialized
actantial roles üat work together in order to select, to establish and to execute a
plan or again in order to revise a given plan, and so on. But at the same time, it
can be considered as a basic function or relation which is common to all other
more specialized functions or relations related to action, interaction and
planning.
The procedure of definition introduces two remarkable operations on
conceptual graphs: t}:.e condsnsaticn of an entire graph to a concept type or a
conceptual relation and, conversely, the expartsion of a concept type or a con-
ceptual relation into an entire graph.
Let us consider again our example of the definiti<¡n of the concept IREMEX]:
the concept [REMEX] is, given the context of our description, strictly equivalent
with its defining graph. So, it could be seen on the one hand as a simple(thematic) dimension and on the other hand as an entire (thematic)
configuration that takes place in a more specialized configuration describing, for
instance, some physical aspects of the feathers of a bird.
As Greimas (1966) and others (Adam and Petiljean 1989) have already
argued, üe condensation of a definitiondescription to a single term or lexeme as
well as the expansion of a single term or lexeme to a whole definitional or
descriptive "text" are two of the most fundamental operations in human
discourse-activity, no matter if this activiry has a specialized technical or scientific
character or if it takes place in our everyday life.
In this sense, the operations of condensation and expansion give a formal
account to the problem we have already pointed out, viz. that a configurational
dimension could often be unfolded in an entire configuration that behaves like a
more general but autonomously organized module in a given (thematic)
configuration in which it is embedded.
P. Stockinger / Crcnceptual analysis
7) Thc Attunmtent of the Validig of a C,onliguration to a Cont¿xt
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The procedure of definition of new concept types and conceptual relations
behaves, quite obviously, like the Porphyrian type of definition that states
necessary and sufficient conditions asserting that "definitio fit per genus
proximum et differentiam specificam".
But it is clear, too, that this type of definition underestimates the role of üe
context in which a definition is valid as, for instance, Coquet 1984 and Eco 1984
have argued from a semiotic point of view. Nevertheless, the Porphyrian qpe of
definition is necessarily valid even for so-called context-dependent and
prototypical definitions. It stipulates only what must be held to be true in a given
context. Without this basic principle, no communication would be possible.
In accordance with Putnam 1975, Eikmeyer 1983, Martin 1987 or Lewis 1973,
this principle can be applied only given a certain context, a certain point of view,
a certain period or a certain place. As Barwise puts it, "an informational situation
s (is factored) into two parts, the representation S and its embedding
circumstances c" (1989: 142). This leads us to the third possibility of the
enriching of a KB, that is, by the means of contextdependent descriptions.
Definitions are attuned here to a set of mntcxt-dependcnt schentafa expressing
specific points of view ("epistemic states" (Gardenfors 1988) or "univers de
croyance" (Martin 1987)) concerning an object of reference. The several points
of view can but must not necessarily be incompatible.
Thus, our statuette in the Louvre can be "seen" and interpreted by a simple
tourist, by a historian of art, by a sculpturer, by a specialist in Christian motifs, by
a restorer of ancient objects, and so on.
We have to distinguish berween partial incompatibility and total incom-
patibiliry: in the first case, a subpart of nvo conflicting descriptions is common to
both; in üe second, there does not exist any common subpart at all and the two
descriptions are not conflicting but incommensurable.
In distinguishing the several poins of üew, a central problem is what could
be considered as the common subpart that is shared by at least a subset of üese
poins of üew. This is important for the construction of very generic (thematic)
configurations that are underspeciñed with respect to a given set of points of üew
or contexts.
These very generic (thematic) conñgurations function as a kind of cünvnon
canonical á¿sis üat enables and controls the communication besyeen the several
more or less distinct points of view and contexs which have aü th¿ir own cananical
basis "containing" the relevant but not globally true (thematic) configurations.
We meet here the same problems as in distributed artificial intelligence
working on the modelization and formalization of the forms of interaction and
communication in a "communiry" of agents ("actors") that cooperate in order to
resolve a problem.
The several canonical bases constitute, in a certain sense, a KB that represents
the knowledge one actor has of the object of reference whereas the common
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canonical basis with üe four rules of formation and the operation of projection
constitutes one component of a general "communication protocol" benveen the
actors of a community.
From a formal point of view, the procedure of schematic definition is
equivalent to üe procedure of the Porphyrian definition. Each schematic qpe
definition is a monadic abstraction l,c u which is written as follows:
schemafor t(c) is u.
Given the fact that üere are several points of view wiü respect to an object of
reference, üere exists a set of schemata which Sowa calls 
-following Putnam
( 1962 )- schcnatic clusters:
'A schematic cluster for a type t is a set of monadic abstractions {Ialur, ...,
Lanun) where each formal parameter a¡ is of type t. Each abstraction X,a¡u¡ in
the set is called a schena for the type t" (Sowa 1984: 129).
Here is a verT simple example of a schematic cluster that represents three
points of üew of an arctic tern: the first one concerns its physical aspects, the
second one concerns its alimentation, and the third one concerns its
reproduction.
l) schemaforARCTIC_TERN (x) is
[SrrnNal 4- (char)- ICOLOUR:'thite"]
(char)- [WUCUT: ,,12 p"1
(char)_ ISIZE: ,,80 cm"]
(poss¡- [wrNc: { * }@ !] q-(char)- ISHAPE](loc)-¡ [TEATHER]
(char)- [COlOUn:'\uhite_and_blue"]
(poss¡- ITAIL] q-(6tr¿¡)- [SI{APE](loc)-¡ IFEATHER]
(char)_ [cotouR:,\,vhite"]
2) schema for ARCTIC_TERN (x) is
lBrRDl a-(¿g¡)- [ALTMENTATToN]
(obj)-> [rolur_or¡ECT: {crustaceous, seaweed, *} ]
3) schema for ARCTIC_TERN (x) is
ISTERNAI q-(¿g¡)- [REpRoDUcTroN ](obj)_ [EGG: {2 t 3}]
(loc-tmp)- [uoNrs: (april, may] l
( tmps_int)- [I-ENCTH: "9y35 days"]
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Even if üe quality of these descriptions is guite disputable üey, neverüeless,
show the interest of üe creation of such schematic clusters. Each schematic
definition is based either on a canonical graph or a graph that is derivable from a
given canonical basis. The first schematic definition, for instance, is based on a
derived graph üat specifies a (thematic) configuration which is appropriate to
the description of the physical aspects of a sub'species of birds. Hypothetically, we
can assume that the second and the third schematic definitions refer to
(thematic) configurations that are derivable from canonical bases that constitute
some fundamental knowledge assumptions concerning, respectively, animal
alimentation an d reproduction.
In üis sense, üe schematic definitions are asserted by üree (groups of¡
actor(s) that behave like specialists who intervene, togeüer or separately, in
order to highlight one or more types of characteristics of an arctic tern. But given
the three canonical bases deñning the "knowledge structure" of our "community"
of experts, üey could as well intervene in a lot of oüer circumstances related
either to the identification of physical properties of a bird or to its reproduction
cycles or to its nutritional habitude.
The strategy to produce schematic definitions is indeed a very interesting one
for the elicitation and description of several knowledge standards. A knowledge
standard is necessarily limited to one or several points of view which are assumed
by an actor. This is not only true for thematic knowledge but also for linguistic
(lexical and grammatical) knowledge, visual knowledge or knowledge concerning
the (formal and physical) organization of a document.
As far as the description of lexical knowledge is concerned, it is intuitively
clear that üe meaning of a '\ivord" depends highly on üe contexts in which it is
used as well as on a presupposed semantic theory to which it refers. The word
"heart" 
-"coeur' in French- refers, among other things, to the physiological
organ, to an edible object, to a sentimental object, to an epistemic object, and so
on. By the means of a schematic type definition, the several meanings of üe word
"coeuro will be broken up following several prominent points of üew (ü2. the
point of üew of physiology, the point of üew of alimentation, the point of üew of
problem solving, ...), and for each one there will be coined an appropriate lexical
description.
As a "communication protocol" between these several meanings, one can
propose either a rather generic description, like in structural semantics 
-i.e.,
"coeur' is a "central organ"-, or an intuitive or "experiential" description, as it
prevails in current cognitive semantics (Lakoff 1987).
We have already mentioned several times the notion of contexts in stipulating
that it has to be taken into account during the description and modelization of
knowledge. It is, indeed, highly artificial to speak about (thematic) configurations
without taking into account the "enüronment" in which they take place and with
which they interact. Furthermore, it does not make much sense to introduce
schematic definitions without making further investigation into the context for
which a schematic definition is provided.
There are several particular problems concerning the description of contexts.
The first one consists in the difficulty of identi$ing a context or a type of conrexts
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and of distinguishing them from other context or tFpe of contexts. It is more or
less unresolved and we have to proceed with quite empirical experiments of trial
and error.
One experiment is üe test of satisfaction: given a certain type of request(s)
concerning an object of reference, can a description provide sadsrying (relevant
as well as verifiable or falsifiable) responses? For instance, the description of üe
statuette in the Louvre taking into account the point of view of the historian of
art, is it sufficiendy relevant for the point of üew of a specialist of Christian
motives, for the point of view of a restorer of ancient objecs, for the point of üew
of a sculpturer, ...?
Anoüer problem concerns the canonical description of the context, viz. a
kind of hypothesis by the means of which we approach and analyse this notion.
Following several investigations in formal pragmatics (Barsch 1986, Galmich
l99l), we assume a little set of basic dimensions that constitute the coordinates
following which a context could be characterized. Among these dimensions we
counr the following ones: [AcToR], [PoINT_oF_vIEw], [rn¡n], [seACE], and
[ASSERT] (Ploteny and Stockinger 1993). It would be too long to justify them
here. Let us note only that they are motivated by the philosophical and
epistemological principle of contractualism or conventionalism as proposed by
Rawls (1971) orLewis (1973).
The important point here is that the quoted dimensions could be unfolded
into entire graphs or a set of graphs. In this sense we are able to account for
contexts in a rather general and non-specified way as well as in ways that are more
and more specialized. Furthermore, there could exist "contexts in a context",viz.
there could exist nested contexts where a given context on the level n could be
'!iewed" under several contexts on the level n-l.
In speaking of the context in terms of conceptual graphs, we have already
mentioned the fact that a context is describable as a (thematic) configuration
that dominates another configuration (or a set of other configurations).
Therefore, the referent of the configuration describing a context is a dimension,
relation or a whole configuration and neither an object "in the world" nor a
linguistic or visual entity.
The representation and formalization of contextualized configurations (ü2.
of configurations that have as their referent anoüer (set of) configuration(s) ) are
handled by nested graphs:
Let p be a concept of type PROPOSITION whose referent is the set {ul, ..., un} of
conceptual graphs: [PROPOSITION: {u¡,..., un} ]. Then each graph u1 in referent (p) is
said to be asserted by üe proposition p, and ui is said to occur in üe context of p (Sowa
1984:139).
Our label IASSERT] corresponds to the label [pRopoSITIoN] quoted by Sowa
and sometimes used in linguistics, where a distinction is made between the
propositional content of a sentence and is modal frame ("modal" is used in a
very wide sense which is more or less equivalent with the notion of "enunciation"
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in pragma-linguistics or with the notion of "propositional attitude" in ordinary
language philosophy).
The representation of contextualized configurations by üe means of nested
graphs is derived, following Sowa, from the existential graphs developed by
Peirce (for a more detailed discussion on the relationships between Sowa's
conceptual graphs and Peirce's existential graphs, see the very interesting paper
of Orstrom (1993).
The several Boolean operators defined in propositional calculus can be
reduced to negation and conjunction. In order to represent them by visual
means, Peirce represented them by the means of nested negative contexts where
one context is visualized by a box. In this way, the conjunction (p"q"r) can be
represented as follows:






r) and can be
represented as follows by the nested negative contexts:
Every box corresponds to a conceptual graph, the nested boxes correspond to
conceptual graphs üat are in the field of the referent of the concept IASSERT]
of üe dominating graph, viz. of the graph representing the nesting box(es), and
the symbol of negation corresponds to a monadic conceptual relation 
-or
operation- that applies to a whole graph:
- 
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In generalizing the technique of nested (negative) contexts and in assuming
that üere are n levels of contextual nesting, we are able to take into account the
partial specificity of contextualized (thematic) configurations that can partially
overlap with other context-dependent configurations as well as üe dynamic
construction of knowledge, the problems of multiple reference, rhe scope of
quantifiers or again the scope of negation.
Let us take into account the problem of the scope of negation discussed by
Sowa (1984). The relation or operation of negation, as it has been introduced
above, applies or has in its scope the whole configuration represented by a




[ IoSTRICH] <-(agt)- [FLY] I l.
Nevertheless, there are situations in which one might give more precise
information in the sense that it is not the ostrich that flies or that it is not flying
that is a (habitual) activiry of the ostrich or even that it is not (intentional) agency
that characterizes the relation benveen an ostrich and flying. Therefore, we would
Iike to deal with such graphs as the following ones:
a) [essent: [- oSTRICH] <-(agr)- [rLY] l
b) [essr,Rr: [oSTRICH] q-(¿g¡)- [- FLY] l
c) [assnRr: IoSTRICH] <-(- agr)- [FLY] l
In order to deal with these graphs, we have to define for the first two graphs a
notion for the negated dim.ension represented by a rugated conccpt insid¿ a gaph.
We already know how to define a negated dimension, namely by the procedure of
type definition, but we do not yet know what should be the body of that
definition. Therefore, let us consider in more detail the first graph (graph a)
asserting that it is not the ostrich that flies. This assertion, in fact, contains two
different assertions: the first one asserts that birds fly (or that there are animals
that fly):
i) [essExr: IBIRD] a-(agt)- [FLY] l




The first assertion constitutes the outermost context (level 0) that is limited to
an epistemical state El of an actor in which it is true that birds fly; the second
assertion constitutes a nested context on level I that is limited to an epistemical
state E2 of an actor in which the epistemical state of the outerrnost context is
negated for ostriches. The context on level 0 dominates the context on level I or,
in other words, the epistemic state E2 in the context on level I presupposes the
epistemic state El in the context in level 0.
In distinguishing berween the two different epistemic states El and Ez
localized on two different contexts where El dominates E2, we can give an
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explicit account of üe implicit or condensed information represented by graph a.
Therefore, the expanded version of the first graph looks like this:
[ASSERT: {[BrRD] a-(ag¡)- [FLy], 
-r [essrRr: [oSTRICH] I ]1.
The expanded version of graph a corresponds exactly to the description of its
meaning in terms of nested contexts and the relation of domination. So, in
considering the expanded version, we now also know which is the "body" that we
need for the definition of a negated dimension represented by a negated
concept:
gpe-rt(x) is [T: *x],-.' [ [t: *x] I I (Sowa 1984: 147)
or:
type: 
-r t(x) is [assrnT: { [T: *x], -r [AssERT: [t: *x] I ] l.
The second graph asserting that it is not the activity of flying that
characterizes ostriches works like the first graph. The outermost context is
restricted to an epistemic state El of an actor in which it is true that the activity of
flyrrg characterizes birds; the context on level I is limited to an epistemic state E2
of an actor that refutes the assumption in El, where El dominates E2.
Finally, the third graph needs the follorving definition of the negation of a
configurational function represented by a conceptual relation:
relation 
-1 r (xl, x2, ..., xn) is[tl: *xl] [t2: *x] ... [tn: *xn]
= 
[(r)-
a_ [tlr xxlJq_ [t2: *x2lq- [tn: *xn] I (Sowa 1984: 148).
Note, that the example of the inability of the ostrich to fly is often quoted in
specialized literature as an example that causes serious problems to the
inheritance mechanism used in partially ordered hierarchies of conceptual
graphs, structured objecs, frames and so on. A special type of non-standard logic
-default logic (Reiter 1980)- has been developed üat should tackle that kind of
problems.
To give an account of the problem of negation in terms of nested graphs is
not incompatible with default logic given the fact that conceptual graphs can be
"translated" in the language of FOPC which can be attuned by special operators
to the requiremens of default logic. But the objectives that we want to pursue
here are to take explicitly into account pragmatic or epistemic factors that
intervene in the revision of a given "theory" of some object of reference or, in
other words, to elaborate a more pragmatically oriented conceptual and formal
framework of the "negotiation" of the validity of knowledge standards between
actors that have to find a solution (a new "equilibrium") for the epistemic c<¡nflict
which opposes them (Stockinger 1992, Ploteny and Stockinger 1993).
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Even if the example of üe scope of a negation is a rather specialized one, the
consequences of the use of üe representation formalism of nested graphs in
knowledge description and representation are not only general but also
important. Let us take the already quoted example of the description of actions
and plan-structures in conflicting situations opposing two or n actors. A scenario
representing such situations of conflict must be composed of at least üree major
types of configuration: a first type of configuration that describes the manifested
actions that are relevant for the evolution of a given crisis, a second type of
configuration that describes the planning of the manifested actions as well as üe
goals that are pursued by an actor, and a third type of configuration that
describes üe "point of view" (the "epistemical state") of an actor with respect to
the crisis and to the context of the crisis constituted, for instance, by the actors
that are in opposition to goals pursued by üe actor.
In considering only the first and the second types of configuration, we have a
nested representation that looks as follows:
This representation refers to a (very simpliñed) description of the basic
intention of Bulgaria pursued during the first war between Bulgaria and Serbia
(1885). The description asserts that Bulgaria pursues a basic action which is üe
obtaining of Eastern Roumelia 
-a region around Plovdiv in modern Bulgaria-
and that is determined by a plan that the actor Bulgaria has at is disposal. The
plan iself exhibits the motives, goals and resources of possible actions that
constitute several options for the realization of the goal(s).
[GOAL: "r. is bulgarian]
[MOTIF: "r. is independent] IRESOURCE: {"occupation" /
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The important aspect here is that the two thematic configurations
representing, respectively, the plan structure and the manifested basic action are
represented by nested graphs, where the outer graph (üat 'lisualizes" the plan
structure) dominates the inner graph (that 'Visualizes" the manifested basic
action).
Given this framework, it becomes possible to "simulate" not only the
manifested changes üat structure the evolution of a crisis but also the motivating
features üat intervene and orient such changes. We have, here, especially, üe
possibility of "simulating" üe selection and üe decision of a particular basic
action given a 'pool" of possible actions that constitute the "resources" of an actor
to realize a goal. Another possibility is, in comparing different plan*tructures, to
infer with a certain probability the selection of a particular basic action given a
certain type of motives as well as a certain type of goals. Naturally, there is again
the third type of configurations taking into account the particular "point of üew"
or "epistemic state" of an actor with respect to a crisis and its context üat restricts
the choice of a possible action in order to satisfy a given goal. We will not in-
troduce here this component of a scenario describing a conflictual situation and
its evolution but indicate only that it contextualizes not only the manifested
actions and the corresponding context but also the plan structures which
constitute its referents. Indeed, the introduction of this third component leads us
to a description of conflicting situations that are closely related to those produced
in the theoretical context of game theory (Schelling 1960).
As we have already stated, knowledge description and representation could be
effected on several levels of generaliry or specificity. The above represented
description is localized on a very general level that asserts only facts that are
related ro the basic action and the basic plan which characterizes conflicting
situations. Like Schank and Abelson (1976), one could decompose, for instance,
the basic action into a series of more particular actions which together realize the
basic action. For instance, the first Serbo-Bulgarian war could be decomposed
into the following series of actions: territorial claim of Bulgaria 
-occupation of
Roumelia by Bulgaria- armed conflict between Bulgaria and Serbia 
-defeat of
Serbia- threat of occupation of Serbia by Bulgaria 
-intervention of Austria in
order to stop the war- acknowledgment of üe unification of Roumelia and
Bulgaria by Austria, Germany and Russia.
Each particular action or action sequence as well as the succession from one
particular action sequence to another is motivated by a plan-structure that
conforms, on the one hand, to üe basic plan described'above and, on üe oüer,
to the given action sequence. So, the description of the evolution of a conflictual
situation takes üe representation of temporally referenced nested graphs that, in
üe simplest cases, 'timulate" the progressive realization of a principal or basic
goal by the means of motivated choices between a "pool" of possible resources
üat are more or less appropriate with respect to the epistemic states of the actor.
In üis sense, the framework of nested graphs representing contextualized
configurations constitutes an explanatory attempt of what Schank and Abelson
(1976) call 'named" or 'stereotyped" plans as well as of plan revisions.
52 LENGUAS MODERNAS 20, 1993
In order to conclude our discussion concerning the framework of nested
graph theory we want to, once again, emphasize that it is an appropriate tool for
the representation and formalization of descriptions that have to take into
account what is now called "multi-expertise", that is to say, the existence of
different and divergent knowledge standards in a given domain of reference.
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